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UNIFIED NATIONAL LEGAL TREATMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: 
A CONTINUING CHALLENGE (*)
By Horacio A. Grigera Naón1
The continuous expansion of International Commercial Arbitration 
translates into newly forged national legislations and important case law 
developments that have revisited basic principles of arbitration law. To 
mention but a few, France,2 Mexico,3 Costa Rica,4 and Florida5 have all, 
to different degrees, revised the legislative and regulatory frameworks 
that governed arbitration in their respective jurisdictions.6
(*) This paper is based on an opening presentation made on 11 October 2011 
at the Eighth Annual Seminar on International Commercial Arbitration held at the 
Washington College of Law, American University, Washington D.C. 
1 Distinguished Practitioner in Residence and Director of the Center for 
International Commercial Arbitration, Washington College of Law, American 
University, Washington D.C.
2 Décret No 2011-48 du 13 Janvier 2011 portant réforme de l’arbitrage [Decree No 
2011-48 of January 13, 2011 on the Reform of Arbitration], JoUrnal offiCiel de la 
réPUbliqUe française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Jan. 11, 2011.
3 Código de Comercio [cóD. com.][Commercial Code], as amended, Diario Oficial 
de la Federación [D.O.], 27 de Enero de 2011 (Mex.) (Articles 1415 — 1480 of the 
Commercial Code; Daily Official Gazette, 27 January 2011 — the “Revision”.); 
Francisco Gonzàlez de Cossio, Amendments to the Mexican Arbitration Statute, 1 
int’l Com. arb. brief Issue 2, page 6; Nadia Darwazeh & Baptiste Rigaudeau, Clues 
to Construing The New French Arbitration Law, 28 J. int’l arb. 381 (2011).
4 Ley No. 8937, Ley sobre Arbitraje Comercial Internacional basada en la Ley 
Modelo de la Comisión de las Naciones Unidas para el Derecho Mercantil Internacional 
(CNUDMI).
5 Bill CS/HB 821 modifying Florida Statutes Chapter 684. (effective on July 
1, 2010). The 2010 Florida Statutes, Title XXXIX Chapter 634 on International 
Commercial Arbitration, fla. stat. ann. § 684 (West 2010).
6 Although recent modifications of international arbitration rules are not the subject 
of this paper, mention should be made of the new International Chamber of Commerce 
Arbitration Rules coming into effect in 2012. ICC Dispute Resolution Rules, 2012 
Rules of Arbitration, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/id4199/
index.html.  See also, Nathalie Voser, Overview of the Most Important Changes in 
the Revised ICC Arbitration Rules, 29 asa bUll. 783 (2011) (providing a succinct 
examination of the most significant revisions implemented by the 2012 ICC Rules); 
Arzu Ongur Ergan, The New [2012] Arbitration Rules of International Chamber of 
Commerce [“ICC”], 4 ankara b. rev. 81 (2011).
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However, far from showing convergence in their approaches, such 
developments often illustrate recurring differences in dealing with pri-
mary issues of international commercial arbitration. Such differences 
naturally impact this field’s continuing evolution, and contrast with 
the seemingly growing consensus on procedural matters developed 
by practitioners and arbitrators within the four corners of the arbitral 
procedure.7
In the United States, a string of recent U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sions has dealt with the pivotal issue of authority repartition between 
arbitrators and courts.8 These decisions, which have mostly occurred in 
domestic labor and employment cases, raised policy issues normally not 
at stake in international commercial arbitration.9 However, these rul-
ings have not expressly dealt with the interpretation of the scope of an 
international arbitration agreement—especially in light of the national 
policy favoring the enforceability of international arbitration clauses.10 
This distinction is all the more important since, in domestic cases, such 
policy favoring arbitration does not extend to issues pertaining to the 
existence, validity, or enforceability of the arbitral agreement.11
7 See Bernard Hanotiau, International Arbitration in a Global Economy: The 
Challenges of the Future, 28 J. Int’l  Arb. 89, 91 (2011) (observing that the globalization 
of the economy and the increase of international arbitration as the preferred method 
of dispute resolution have contributed to a convergence and harmonization in the rules 
governing arbitration); see also Radicati Di Brozolo, The Impact of National Law and 
Courts on International Commercial Arbitration: Mythology, Physiology, Pathology, 
Remedies and Trends,  Paris J. int’l arb. 663 (2011) (“The consequence of this change 
in State attitudes is that international commercial arbitration is less and less influenced 
and limited by domestic legal systems and controls.”).
8 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010); 
Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010); Granite Rock v. Intern. 
Broth. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 
S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
9 For example, in the areas of labor and employment law, the cases Rent-a-Center 
and Granite Rock are essentially concerned with balancing employer-employee interests 
in light of the agreed upon arbitration clause.
10 Especially regarding U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the seminal cases Scherk 
v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). In these cases the tribunal applied a pro-
arbitration interpretation policy in construing and enforcing arbitration agreements.
11 See Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Broth. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2957-58 
(2010) (emphasizing that in labor disputes, as in other disputes, the permissive policies 
favoring arbitration only apply once the validity and existence of the arbitration 
agreement have been properly asserted).
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Also referred to as gateway or threshold issues,12 these issues were 
recently addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Rent-a-Center West 
Inc. v. Jackson,13 Granite Rock Company v. International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters,14 and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.15
In Rent-a-Center, the Court held that where the issue of arbitrabil-
ity itself has been expressly delegated to the arbitrators, the question 
of whether the arbitration agreement was unconscionable was to be 
decided by the tribunal and not by the courts.16  In that case, the claimant, 
Mr. Jackson filed an employment discrimination suit against his former 
employer, Rent-a-Center West Inc., in the United States District Court 
for the District of Nevada.17 In response, Rent-a-Center filed a motion 
to dismiss the claim and compel arbitration.18 Mr. Jackson objected to 
the motion arguing that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable 
and therefore unenforceable.19 Rent-a-Center contended that because 
the arbitration agreement allocated the issue of enforceability to the 
arbitrator’s exclusive authority, the question of whether the agreement 
was vitiated by unconscionability—and thus unenforceable—fell within 
the ambit of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction.20 The District Court granted 
Rent-a-Center’s motion but failed to address Jackson’s procedural 
unconscionability arguments.21 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed in 
part and held that where “a party challenges an arbitration agreement as 
unconscionable, and thus asserts that he could not meaningfully assent 
to the agreement, the threshold question of unconscionability is for the 
court.”22
12 Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2777 (observing that “parties can agree to arbitrate 
‘gateway’ questions of arbitrability,’ such as whether the parties have agreed to 
arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular controversy) (citing Green 
Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003)).
13 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
14 Granite, 130 S. Ct. at 2847.
15 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
16 Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2780.
17 Jackson v. Rent-a-Car-Center-West, Inc., No. 03:07–CV–0050–LRH (RAM), 
2007 WL 7030394 (D. Nev. June 6, 2007).
18 Id.
19 Id. at 2.
20 Id. at 3.
21 Id. (refusing to examine the procedural unconscionability arguments raised 
by Jackson because the doctrine of unconscionability requires satisfaction of both 
substantive and procedural elements, and here, the substantive prong was not met).
22 Jackson v. Rent-a-Center W., Inc., 581 F.3d 912, 920 (9th Cir. 2009).
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Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia reversed the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and affirmed once more the 
principle that, unless the parties have clearly and unequivocally del-
egated the decision of such matter to the arbitrators, it is for the courts 
to decide on the validity, enforceability, and scope of the arbitration 
clause—and not for the arbitrators.23 In Rent-a-Center, the arbitration 
clause expressly referred its interpretation, formation and enforce-
ability to the arbitrators.24 More interestingly, the Court reasoned that 
because Mr. Jackson had not specifically invoked the unconscionability 
of the provision that expressly delegated the issue of arbitrability to the 
arbitrators,25 then, as a consequence, it was for the arbitrators to decide 
on the alleged unconscionability of the arbitration clause.26 In referring 
the case to arbitration, the Court applied the Prima Paint/Buckeye ratio-
nale and considered the arbitration clause a separate contract.27
Likewise, in Granite Rock Company v. International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters,28 the U.S Supreme Court reiterated the principle pursuant to which 
gateway issues are to be determined by the courts except where the parties 
have expressly delegated the decision of such issues to the arbitrators.29
23 Rent-a-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2778.
24 The Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims contained in his employment contract 
read: “[t]he Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have 
exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relation to the interpretation, applicability, 
enforceability or formation of this Agreement including, but not limited to any claim 
that all or any part of this Agreement is void or voidable.” Rent-A-Center, 130 S.Ct. at 
2775 (2010).
25 Id. at 2779 (“[a]ccordingly, unless Jackson challenged the delegation provision 
specifically, we must treat it as valid under § 2, and must enforce it under §§ 3 and 4, 
leaving any challenge to the validity of the Agreement as a whole for the arbitrator”).
26 Id.
27 Id. Under Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), 
challenges to the validity of the contract containing the arbitration clause are to be 
determined by the arbitrators. However, challenges to the validity of the arbitration 
clause itself are to be decided by the courts of law. In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), the same reasoning applied when objections to the 
jurisdiction of the arbitrators was premised on a stale statute invalidating the contract 
covered by the arbitration clause.
28 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010).
29 Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Broth. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2858 (2010) (“[O]
ur precedents hold that courts should order arbitration of a dispute only where the 
court is satisfied that neither the formation of the parties’ arbitration agreement nor 
(absent a valid provision specifically committing such disputes to an arbitrator) its 
enforceability or applicability to the dispute is in issue.”).
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Framed differently than Rent-a-Car, the dispute in Granite Rock 
turned not on whether but on “when the CBA [collective bargaining 
agreement] that contain[ed] the parties’ arbitration clause was ratified 
and thereby formed.”30 In appearance, the issue was thus tailored as one 
of time and not existence. Yet, as the Court pointed out, the conceptual 
boundary that separates the two notions is artificial at best, articulating 
that the question of time was necessarily subsumed under the broader 
question of existence.31
In Granite Rock, the parties agreed that the District Court had 
jurisdiction to determine the arbitrability of their ‘date-of-ratification’ 
dispute. However, they disagreed on the outcome of that decision, 
respondent Local contending that the District Court erred in finding 
that CBA’s ratification date was an issue for the court to decide.32 The 
Court of Appeals agreed and reversed the District Court’s judgment, 
holding that the CBA’s arbitration clause controlled the parties’ issue for 
three reasons. In reaching this conclusion, the court considered the fol-
lowing: (1) the clause clearly covers the related strike claims;33 (2) the 
‘national policy favoring arbitration’ requires that any ambiguity con-
cerning the scope of the parties’ arbitration clause be resolved in favor 
of arbitrability;34 (3) Granite Rock ‘implicitly’ consented to arbitrate the 
ratification-date dispute ‘by suing under the contract.’”35
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.36 Reiterating the First Option/
Buckeye rationale, as well as its more recent Rent-a-Center judg-
ment, the Court held that courts should compel arbitration only when 
the court considers that there are no issues regarding the formation of 
the parties’ arbitration agreement or its applicability to the dispute.37 
Where a party contests either or both matters, the court must resolve the 
disagreement.38
30 Id. at 2856.
31 Id. at 2860 (“for purposes of determining arbitrability, when a contract is formed 
can be as critical as whether it was formed.”).
32 Id.
33 Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Broth. of Teamsters, 546 F.3d 1169, 1177 (9th Cir. 2008).
34 Id. at 1178.
35 Id.
36 Granite Rock Co. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2866 
(2010).
37 Absent a valid provision specifically committing such disputes to an arbitrator. Id. 
at 2855-56.
38 Id. at 2857-58.
6 THE ARBITRATION BRIEF Volume 2
The Court further clarified that the question of when a contract is 
formed is not necessarily different from the question of whether it was 
formed at all. Quite logically, until the contract comes into effect, the 
contract is not formed, and the same goes for the arbitration agreement 
stipulated therein. Consistent with that approach, the when issue is sub-
sumed under the whether determination.39
To determine when the matters allegedly covered by the arbitration 
clause become effectively arbitrable, one must first determine when the 
underlying contract came into effect and whether the parties ever con-
sented entering into an effective agreement on the alleged date. Indeed, 
absent a distinct stipulation as to the arbitration clause’s effective date, 
if the main contract does not enter into effect, then the arbitration 
agreement does not come into effect.40 Accordingly, determining the 
arbitration clause’s timeliness issue amounts to determining when the 
main contract began to exist—which is a determination for the courts. 
In other words, if the question of timeliness—i.e. when the arbitration 
agreement comes into effect and when the matters covered by the clause 
become arbitrable—amounts to a determination of whether the parties 
to the main contract consented to enter into such an agreement on a 
specific date, then the timeliness issue falls within the court’s jurisdic-
tion—and not to the arbitrator.41
In AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,42 a decision on a motion to compel 
arbitration, the U.S. Supreme Court, showing little sympathy for class 
action arbitrations, rejected the argument that the arbitration clause was 
unconscionable because it prohibited parties from having recourse to 
39 Id. at 2860 (stating that “as here, the date on which an agreement was ratified 
determines the date the agreement was formed, and thus determines whether 
agreement’s provisions were enforceable during the period relevant to the parties’ 
dispute.”).
40 Unless there is a distinct stipulation as to the arbitration clause’s effective date. Id. 
at 2860 (“for purposes of determining arbitrability when a contract is formed can be 
as critical as whether it was formed. That is the case where, as here, the date on which 
an agreement was ratified determines the date the agreement was formed, and thus 
determines whether the agreement’s provisions were enforceable during the period 
relevant to the parties’ dispute.”).
41 Id.
42 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
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class-action proceedings.43 In 2002, Vincent and Liza Concepcion signed 
an agreement with AT&T for the sale and service of cellular phones.44 
The phones purchased by the Concepcions from AT&T were advertised 
as free. However, AT&T charged the Concepcions sales tax based on 
the phones’ retail value.45 To challenge this practice, the Concepcions 
sued AT&T in the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of California. Their complaint, which alleged inter alia that AT&T had 
engaged in false advertisement and fraud,46 was later consolidated in a 
class action.
In 2008, AT&T opposed such consolidation and moved to compel 
arbitration under the terms of its contract with the Concepcions.47 The 
Concepcions objected to AT&T’s motion, contending that the arbitration 
agreement’s prohibition of class-action proceedings was “unconsciona-
ble and unlawfully exculpatory” under California law.48 Despite view-
ing the arbitration agreement favorably, the District Court ultimately 
denied AT&T’s motion and sided with the Concepcions.49 On appeal, 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the arbitration agreement was 
43 The clause specifically provided that “individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff 
or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding.” Id. at 1744. 
The U.S. Supreme Court showed a similar lack of sympathy in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010), a case in which it decided to reverse 
a decision to vacate a partial award holding that class arbitration was not excluded 
pursuant to a clause “silent” on that issue.
44 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
45 Id.
46 By charging sales tax on phones it advertised as free.
47 The cell phone contract provided for arbitration of all disputes but disallowed 
class action arbitrations. Id.
48 131 S. Ct. at 1745.
49 In doing so, the District Court held that the arbitration clause was unconscionable 
because AT&T had not shown that bilateral arbitration adequately substituted for the 
deterrent effects of class actions. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745. The District Court’s decision 
was based on Discover Bank Laster v. AT&T Mobility L.L.C., 36 Cal. 4th 148, 162-
65 (2005) where the court found that (1) a waiver of class arbitration in a consumer 
contract of adhesion is unconscionable under certain circumstances and should not be 
enforced, and (2) prohibition of class action waivers in arbitration agreements is not 
preempted by the FAA. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (citing Laster v. AT&T Mobility Inc., 
584 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2009)).
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unconscionable and that the Discover Bank rule50 was not preempted by 
the FAA.51
Granting certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court had to resolve whether 
§ 2 of the FAA preempted the Supreme Court of California’s decision in 
Discover Bank.52 The outcome of that initial determination conditioned 
whether the Ninth Circuit had correctly denied AT&T’s motion to com-
pel arbitration or not.
The Court began its analysis by characterizing § 2 as the embodi-
ment of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.53 Central to this 
characterization is the principle that courts must place arbitration agree-
ments on equal footing with other contracts and enforce them accord-
ing to their terms.54 Sometimes referred to as the saving clause, the last 
clause in § 2 authorizes agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by 
generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or uncon-
scionability.55 However, such defenses cannot operate if they solely 
target arbitration.56
The Court observed that California courts have frequently invoked 
the saving clause to find arbitration agreements unconscionable. In fact, 
50 Holding waivers of class-arbitration in consumer contracts unenforceable.
51 In Discover Bank, the California Supreme Court applied California’s doctrine of 
unconscionability to class-section waivers in arbitration agreements and held: “[W]hen 
the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes 
between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when 
it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to 
deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money, 
then… the waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party ‘from responsibility 
for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another.’ Under these 
circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under California law and should not be 
enforced.” Discover Bank v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 
2005). The Ninth Circuit observed that such interpretation of California law did not 
discriminate against arbitration—which the FAA prohibits—and that “class proceedings 
will reduce the efficiency and expeditiousness of arbitration.” Additionally, it noted that 
Discover Bank placed arbitration agreements with class-action waivers on the exact same 
footing as contracts that bar class-action litigation outside the context of arbitration.
52 That is, the rule automatically classifying most collective arbitration waivers in 
consumer contracts as unconscionable.
53 See 131 S. Ct. at 1744 (“Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) makes 
agreements to arbitrate ‘valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds 
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’”).
54 Id.
55 9 U.S.C. § 2.
56 Id. at 1746.
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the Concepcions argued that the Discover Bank rule, given its roots in 
California’s unconscionability doctrine and policy against exculpation, 
fell within the boundaries of the saving’s clause since the unconscio-
nability doctrine upon which it rests “exists at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.”57
According to the Court, when State law prohibits the arbitration of 
a particular type of claim, the FAA displaces the conflicting rule. But 
the question remains when, as here, a doctrine generally thought to be 
applicable is alleged to operate in a fashion that disfavors arbitration. 
To answer that question, the Court reiterated its reasoning in Perry v. 
Thomas.58 Although § 2’s saving clause preserves generally applicable 
contract defenses, it certainly does not safeguard state law rules that 
impair and hinder the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.59 Siding 
with AT&T, the Court ultimately concluded that the arbitration agree-
ment was not unconscionable because “requiring the availability of 
class-wide arbitration interfere[d] with fundamental attributes of arbi-
tration and thus create[d] a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”60
Evidenced by the above decisions, the Supreme Court’s approach 
contrasts with the French approach to both domestic and international 
arbitrations.61  According to French arbitration law, it is for the arbitra-
tors to decide matters concerning their own jurisdiction—including any 
jurisdictional objections as to the existence, validity, and scope of the 
57 Id. at 1747.
58 482 U.S. 483, 492 (1987) (noting that the FAA’s preemptive effect might even 
extend to grounds traditionally thought to exist ‘at law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract.’). 
59 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (“[A] federal statute’s saving clause “‘cannot in reason be 
construed as [allowing] a common law right, the continued existence of which would 
be absolutely inconsistent with the provisions of the act. In other words, the act cannot 
be held to destroy itself.’”) (citing American Telephone & Telegraph v. Central Office 
Telephone, Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 227-28 (1998)).
60 131 S. Ct. at 1748.
61 See Décret No 2011-48 du 13 Janvier 2011 portant réforme de l’arbitrage [Decree 
No 2011-48 of January 13, 2011 on the Reform of Arbitration], JoUrnal offiCiel de la 
réPUbliqUe française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Jan. 11, 2011 (entrenching a 
little further the principle of compétence-compétence pursuant to which french courts, 
unlike U.S. courts, must affirmatively decline jurisdition over any issue arising under a 
matter covered by an arbitration agreement, and notably in situations where such issue 
touches the parties’ consent to arbitration).
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arbitration agreement.62 Indeed, pursuant to Article 1448 of the French 
Code of Civil Procedure, a court of law shall decline its jurisdiction 
in favor of arbitration in a dispute subject to an arbitration agreement 
when the dispute is brought before the court after the arbitral tribunal 
has been constituted.63 Otherwise, the court shall equally decline juris-
diction unless it finds the arbitration agreement to be manifestly void or 
inapplicable—matters that the court will consider only on the basis of 
a prima facie inquiry.64 In conclusion, there is little margin for French 
courts to retain jurisdiction to decide gateway or threshold issues even 
in situations in which the inexistence, unenforceability, or invalidity of 
the arbitration agreement is alleged.65
Significant differences between French and U.S. arbitration may also 
be noticed in the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards, and 
more particularly concerning the enforceability of an award set aside by 
the courts of the arbitral seat. Indeed, absent clear evidence that the for-
eign judgment setting aside the award is contrary to U.S. public policy,66 
U.S. courts are generally reluctant to enforce such awards.67 This reluc-
tance is due to Article V(1)(e) of the 1958 New York Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New 
62 E. Gaillard & P. De Lapasse, Le Nouveau Droit Français de l’Arbitrage Interne et 
International, reCUeil dalloZ 175 (2011).
63 noUveaU Code de ProCédUre Civile [N.C.P.C.] art 1448 (Fr.).
64 Id.; E. Loquin, La Réforme du Droit Française de l’Arbitrage, RTD. Com. 255, 
264 (2011).
65 See E. Loquin, La Réforme du Droit Français de l’Arbitrage, RTD. Com. 255, 264 
(2011) (observing that only in instances of prima facie invalidity will a court retain 
jurisdiction over the dispute).
66 A foreign award is contrary to public policy if it is “repugnant to fundamental 
notions of what is just and decent.” See Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 864 
(D.C.Cir.1981) (citing Rest.2d Conflict of Laws § 117, comment c (1971)).
67 Exceptionally, in Matter of Arbitration Between Chromalloy Aeroservices, a Div. 
of Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp. & Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 
1996), a U.S. District Court granted the confirmation of an award set aside in Egypt 
under Egyptian law after the initiation of proceedings to confirm such award in the 
United States. In its decision, the U.S. court referred to Article VII of the New York 
Convention. Clashing with the decision of the Egyptian courts to set aside the award 
because it would have disregarded the application of Egyptian Law to the merits of the 
dispute, it relied upon U.S federal public policy. Under Article 53 (1)(D) of Egyptian 
Law 27 of 1994 on arbitration on civil and commercial matters, an award rendered in 
Egypt may he set aside if it “. . . eliminates the application of the law which the parties 
to arbitration have agreed to apply to the subject of the dispute.” (Arbitration in Africa, 
E. Cotran & A. Amissah Editors, at 408 (1996)).
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York Convention”),68 which denies extraterritorial effects to a foreign 
award set aside in the country of origin.69
The French approach is very different from the U.S. approach. 
French courts will not take into account the laws or decisions of the 
country of the arbitral seat when considering the recognition or enforce-
ment of foreign awards.70 Indeed, according to French law, “international 
arbitral awards are not anchored in any national legal order, constitute 
an international justice decision, and their validity must be ascertained 
on the basis of the rules applicable in the country in which its recogni-
tion and enforcement is sought.”71
A French court will recognize or enforce a foreign award set aside in 
the country of the seat of the arbitration only if two conditions are met: 
(i) the award is not manifestly contrary to French international public 
policy; and (ii) the party seeking recognition or enforcement produces 
a copy of the award.72 The New York Convention permits any party to 
the enforcement procedure of a New York Convention award to assert 
any rights it may avail itself of under the local law or the treaties of 
such country.73 Further, French courts are likely to favor the applica-
tion of French provisions on the recognition and the enforcement of 
foreign awards over Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention in such 
instances because French jurisprudence allows for the enforcement of 
68 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(New York, 10 June 1958) 330 U.N.T.S. 3; 21 U.S.T. 2517; T.I.A.S. No. 6997, entered 
into force 7 June 1959.
69 Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir.1999); see 
also TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 928 (2007) (holding that 
“under York Convention, Colombian arbitration award would not be enforced after 
being set aside, regardless of whether grounds relied upon for nullification would have 
been valid in United States”).
70 Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., June 29, 
2007, Bull. civ. I, No. 05-18.053 [hereinafter Putrabali]. The case can also be found at 
3 revUe de l’arbitrage 507 (2007).
71 Id.; Emmanuel Gaillard, Note—29 juin 2007—Cour de cassation (1re Ch. civ.), 3 
rev. arb. 517 (2007); Philippe Pinsolle, The Status of Vacated Awards in France: The 
Cour de Cassation Decision in Putrabali, 24 arb. int’l 277 (2008).
72 noUveaU Code de ProCédUre Civile [N.C.P.C.] art 1514, 1515 (Fr.).
73 Art. VII(1), Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (New York, 10 June 1958) 330 U.N.T.S. 3; 21 U.S.T. 2517; T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 
entered into force 7 June 1959.
12 THE ARBITRATION BRIEF Volume 2
a foreign award that had been previously set aside by the courts of the 
arbitral seat.74
More shocking are the disparities that have occurred in the enforce-
ment of arbitral awards where the deciding courts had applied the same 
laws to the arbitration. Indeed, the validity or enforceability of an arbi-
tral award may be viewed very differently depending on the forum in 
which the award is subject to court review. This is so even when (i) such 
enforceability requires passing judgment on the validity and scope of 
the arbitration agreement on the basis of which the award was rendered; 
and (ii) both national courts involved applied the law of the arbitral seat 
in determining such issues.75
Dallah Real Estate v. Pakistan illustrates these disparities.76 There, 
the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom had to decide on Respondent 
Government of Pakistan’s objections77 to the enforcement in England of 
an award rendered in France pursuant to Article V(I)(a) of the New York 
Convention.78 The key issue was whether Respondent was a party to 
the agreement between Appellant Dallah—a group providing services 
for the Holy Places in Saudi Arabia—and the Awami Hajj Trust (“The 
Trust”) established by the President of Pakistan to provide services to 
Pakistani pilgrims visiting Mecca for the Hajj.79 The agreement, which 
was intended for purposes of building housing near Mecca to accom-
modate the pilgrims, contained an arbitration clause signed by Dallah 
and the Trust.80 Appellant sought enforcement of the award in the High 
Court of England. The High Court denied enforcement, finding that 
Respondent was not a party to the agreement.81 The Court of Appeals 
affirmed, and Dallah appealed to the British Supreme Court.
74 Putrabali, 3 revUe de l’arbitrage 507 (2007).
75 Id.
76 Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co. v. The Ministry of Religious Affairs, 
Gov’t of Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46 (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/
decided-cases/docs/UKSC_2009_0165_Judgment.pdf.
77 Id. These objections were based on Article V (I)(a) of the New York Convention 
and reflected by Section 103 (2)(b) of the English Arbitration Act of 1996.
78 And reflected under Section 103(2)(b) of the English Arbitration Act.
79 A few months after the agreement between Dallah and the Trust was signed, the 
Trust was dissolved.
80 Dallah, UKSC 46 (Nov. 3, 2010) at ¶4.
81 Id. at ¶10.
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Respondent Government of Pakistan alleged that the arbitration 
agreement was invalid under the laws of the arbitral seat, France.82 
Specifically, Respondent denied being a party to the arbitration agree-
ment under French law.83 After determining that French law governed the 
issue, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom rejected the enforce-
ment of the award.84 The Court ruled that, while arbitral tribunals have 
the power to decide their own jurisdiction, such a determination remains 
subject to court review when one of the parties seeks to enforce or set 
aside the award—regardless of where the arbitral seat is.85 In doing so, 
the Court rejected Appellant’s argument that the fact that Respondent 
did not challenge the award in the courts of the seat precluded judi-
cial review in Britain of the tribunal’s jurisdiction. Under French law, 
the issue was whether there was “common intention” in the actions of 
Respondent and Appellant that would indicate Respondent was a party 
to the agreement.86 The Court ruled that Respondent had satisfactorily 
proven that the actions of the parties showed no such intention.
These same issues were raised to set aside that award and oth-
ers rendered in the same case before the Paris Court of Appeals in 
Gouvernement de Pakistan —Ministère des Affaires Réligieuses.87 By 
running essentially the same analysis88 under the same French law, and 
of the same facts considered by the English Supreme Court, the First 
Chamber of the Paris Court of Appeals denied the motion to set aside 
the arbitral award against the Pakistani Government, thereby upholding 
the arbitration agreement’s validity and its extension to the Pakistani 
82 The enforcement of an arbitral award can be refused if the arbitration agreement 
is deemed invalid under applicable law—in this case French law. The agreement would 
be invalid if the party against whom the award is sought to be enforced was not party 
to the agreement.
83 Dallah, UKSC 46 (Nov. 3, 2010) at ¶1.
84 Id. at ¶70.
85 Id. at ¶22, 23. Art. V of the New York Convention allows a party who did not 
consent to arbitration to challenge the tribunal’s jurisdiction.
86 Dallah, UKSC 46 (Nov. 3, 2010) at ¶17,18.
87 Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e ch., Feb. 17, 2011. For 
a note of this decision, Gilles Cuniberti, Divergence d’Appréciation entre Juges 
Français et Anglais du Contrôle sur l’Existence d’une Convention d’Arbitrage, Paris 
J. int’l arb. 433 (2011).
88 Both courts applied France’s substantive rules of international commercial 
arbitration that govern the issue of whether an arbitration agreement’s scope ratione 
personae should extend to a non-signatory.
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State.89 Accordingly, the French court considered that the Government 
of Pakistan’s conduct sufficed to show that it had intended to become a 
party to the arbitration agreement.
If such developments prove anything, it is the paramount importance 
of (i) looking before leaping when selecting the seat of the arbitration, 
and (ii) becoming aware of the uncertainties that may arise when enforc-
ing an award in a forum distinct of the arbitral seat. Such developments 
also reveal that the lack of a unified national treatment of vital matters 
concerning international commercial arbitration is a source of unpre-
dictability, which in turn may negatively affect its future development. 
Even greater inconstancy or inequalities of treatment may exist if—in 
the absence of an arbitration agreement—the resolution of international 
disputes is left to national courts of law. This is troubling because the 
objective of agreeing to arbitration is precisely to minimize uncertainty 
and insecurity in the realm of international transactions.
It is certainly desirable to obtain a unified, or at least harmonic, treat-
ment of central arbitral issues by national legislators because it would 
certainly safeguard international commercial arbitration autonomy from 
the unwarranted national courts interference. However, such harmoni-
zation cannot be attained merely through the worldwide adaption of 
similar legal texts by national legislators. Rather, those texts must also 
be uniformly interpreted and applied by national courts in a manner 
that reflects the same liberal approach in favor of international arbitra-
tion. This approach may require a differentiated legislative treatment 
of domestic and international commercial arbitration. Additionally, 
national courts may be required to avoid applying to international com-
mercial arbitrations solutions that are normally fashioned for domestic 
cases. Applying solutions fit for domestic cases leads courts to reach 
conclusions based on public policy concerns and principles normally 
excluded from the province of international commercial arbitration.
Rather, international arbitration cases should be resolved under 
more permissive policies—those favoring arbitration as a method of 
international dispute resolution. Such differentiated treatment may have 
the salutary effect of ensuring that international commercial arbitra-
tion issues are governed by rules and principles specifically adapted to 
their particular characteristics. Simultaneously, this treatment will avoid 
the extension of the application of such rules or principles to specific 
domestic law areas, where other policies and principles deserve special 
89 Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e ch., Feb. 17, 2011.
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or prevailing consideration when matters covered by such areas are sub-
ject to arbitration in a domestic setting.
Whether attaining such harmonization falls within the realm of fan-
tasy or not remains to be seen, but it seems unquestionable that such 
harmonization is all the more desirable. After all, international com-
mercial arbitration can only progress under the benevolent shadow of 
national legislators and of courts fully cognizant of the positive role 
played by international commercial arbitration in the world economy.
